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Shaming and Framing: Norwegian Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations

Tjernshaugen, Andreas, Lee, Ho-Ching (Working Paper;2004:09)

This paper discusses the strategies chosen by Norwegian-based environmental non-governmental organizations(ENGOs) and their international allies in the Climate Action Network (CAN) in seeking to influence Norway’s behaviour in the UN climate change negotiations. We focus on ENGO activities at the ma...

The cost of sectoral differentiation: The case of the EU emissions trading scheme

Steffen Kallbekken (Working Paper;2004:08)

It is often assumed in the economic literature that the Kyoto Protocol will be implemented through a cost-efficient, comprehensive emissions trading system. However, the general experience from implementation of environmental policies suggests that governments will adopt a more differentiated approa...

The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway

Hovi, Jon, Steffen Kallbekken (Working Paper;2004:07)

To induce compliance, an international enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, it is reasonable to require that such consequences do not cause considerable damage to other countries as well. The compliance mechanism of the K...

The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation

Helland, Leif, Hovi, Jon (Working Paper;2004:06)

The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version of the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma, Scott Barrett has been...

Why the CDM can reduce carbon leakage

Steffen Kallbekken (Working Paper;2006:02)

Carbon leakage is an important concern because it can reduce the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The Clean Development Mechanism, one of the flexibility mechanisms allowed under the protocol, has the potential to reduce carbon leakage significantly because it reduces the relative...

Nuclear Energy: Rise, Fall and Resurrection

Twena, Michelle (Working Paper;2006:01)

This paper charts the rise, fall and potential resurrection of the civilian nuclear power industry over the past fifty years in the UK. The role of actors, interests, institutions and ideas are explored using Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated equilibrium model of agenda-setting. The study provide...

Analysis of EU member states' national allocation plans

Kolshus, Hans H., Asbjørn Torvanger (Working Paper;2005:02)

The European Union’s (EU) emissions trading scheme (ETS) started on 01 January 2005. The ETS covers CO2 emissions from large emitters in the power and heat generation industry and selected energy-intensive industrial sectors. The EU member states have developed national allocation plans (NAP) statin...

Climate vulnerability in Cuba: The role of social networks

Sygna, Linda (Working Paper;2005:01)

The case of Cuba offers a unique opportunity to investigate the dynamism of climate vulnerability. This paper takes a closer look at recent economic and social developments in Cuba, and how these affect patterns of vulnerability. Faced with the ongoing processes of climate change and economic global...

Meeting Kyoto Commitments: European Union Influence on Norway and Germany

Vevatne, Jonas, Twena, Michelle, Lee, Ho-Ching, Guri Bang (Working Paper;2004:12)

In this paper, we seek to understand and explain how the EU has influenced the climate change policymaking processes in Norway and Germany, despite strong prior national preferences. We ask how the EU has affected the choice and design of climate policy instruments. Has the EU been a decisive factor...

Trading for the Future: Signaling in Permit Markets

Eskeland, Gunnar S., Harstad, Bård (Working Paper;2007:01)

Tradable pollution permits are celebrated as a political instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal abatement costs through trade and (ii) they government to distribute the burden of the policy in a politically fair and feasible way. These two concerns, however, conflict in a dynamic...